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Abstract. A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and mar-
keting is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect
the behavior of other members of the society called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have
a considerable impact on the behavior of markets and other social agglomerations being made up
of individual actors choosing among a number of alternatives. For marketing or policy purposes it
appears to be interesting to investigate the effect of different opinion leader-follower structures in
markets or any other collective decision-making situations in a society.
We study a two-action model in which the members of a society are to choose one action,
for instance, to buy or not to buy a certain joint product, or to vote yes or no on a specific proposal.
Each of the actors has an inclination to choose one of the actions. By definition opinion leaders have
some power over their followers, and they exercise this power by influencing the behavior of their
followers, i.e. their choice of action. After all actors have chosen their actions, a decision-making
mechanism determines the collective choice resulting out of the individual choices. Making use of
bipartite digraphs we introduce novel satisfaction and power scores which allow us to analyze the
actors’ satisfaction and power with respect to the collective choice for societies with different opinion
leader-follower structures. Moreover, we study common dictator and opinion leader properties of
the above scores and illustrate our findings for a society with five members.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Keywords: Bipartite digraph, influence, inclination, collective choice, opinion leader,
follower, satisfaction, power, dictator properties, opinion leader properties
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Marlies Ahlert, Yener Altunbas, Matthew
Braham, Shanti Chakravarty, David Hojman, Manfred Holler, Christian Klamler, Hart-
mut Kliemt, Andreas Nohn, Hannu Nurmi, Georg von Wangenheim, and two anonymous
referees for comments and discussions.
1 Introduction
The concept of opinion leadership received considerable attention in sociology and market-
ing. It rose out of the two-step flow of communication theory introduced by the ‘Lazarsfeld
group’ (see e.g. Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955, and Lazarsfeld et al., 1968, [29, 31]). In its
most rudimentary form it claims that ‘ideas often flow from radio and print to the opin-
ion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population’ (Lazarsfeld et
al., 1968, [31]). For instance, Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, [31]) investigated the influence of
mass communication on the 1940 presidential election campaign in the US. They found
that the voters’ choices were more influenced by actors which they called opinion leaders
than by mass communication and concluded that the communication process is not a
one- but a two-step process. According to this model information distributed by mass
media first reaches the so-called opinion leaders. These are actors who are specified as
highly self-confident with strong opinions. In Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, [31]) they act as in-
termediaries between the mass media and the recipients. In general, the latter actors are
called followers. They feel attracted by the opinion leaders holding them in high esteem
and are prepared to accept their opinion for their own behavior. Hence, a major char-
acteristic of opinion leaders is their exercised power over their followers. After critiques
of the model by the ‘Lazarsfeld group’ (see e.g. Bostian, 1970, [6]), Troldahl (1966, [41])
introduced a modified version of their model called the two-cycle flow of communication
model which corresponded to other results in the field (see e.g. Deutschmann and Daniel-
son, 1960, [13]). Troldahl’s model distinguishes between two phases in the communication
process. Phase one is a flow of information from the mass media to the members of the
society which is assumed to be a one-step process, i.e. the information goes directly to
all members of the society. Phase two is the flow of influence on beliefs and behavior
which is assumed to be a two-step process. In a first step opinion leaders form their own
opinion based on additional information provided by experts, such as academics, while
in a subsequent second step they try to influence the behavior of their followers. Since
Troldahl’s contribution the literature on opinion leadership has provided a strong body
of knowledge of how and why opinion leaders influence followers choices (see Hoyer and
Stockburger-Sauer, 2007, [27]).
Opinion leaders form an attractive group for marketing and policy purposes (see e.g.
Hoyer and Stockburger-Sauer, 2007, [27]) as the existence (or non-existence) of opinion
leaders in a society and their relations to their followers may have a considerable impact on
market behavior (such as consumer or financial markets), and other social agglomerations
being made up of individual actors choosing among a number of alternatives (open to
them at a given time). Hence, it appears to be interesting to investigate the effect of
different opinion leader-follower structures in markets or other collective decision-making
situations in a society. This includes questions such as whether it would be worthwhile
to establish a new opinion leader in a society or whether a change in an existing opinion
leader-follower structure can be expected to make a difference to the society. However, to
our best knowledge there exists no study which addresses such issues on bare theoretical
grounds. In this paper we lay the foundation to fill out this lacunae by introducing novel
power and satisfaction scores for societies with opinion leaders.1 The former informs us
about the power distribution among the members of the society with respect to their
ability to affect the state of the society concerning a specific outcome, while the latter
tells us to which degree members of the society can be expected to end up with an
outcome that they like. Moreover, in this paper we study common dictator and opinion
1 Note that this research is in some respects also related to work on opinion leaders and the Condorcet Jury
Theorem (see, e.g., Estlund, 1994, [15]), threshold models of collective behavior (see, e.g., Granovetter, 1978,
and Granovetter and Soong, 1986, [23, 24]) and, in more general terms to the literature on network externalities.
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leader properties of the above scores and illustrate our findings for a society with five
members.
For our analysis we consider the example of binary choice as it can also be found in
Sinha and Raghavendra (2006, [37]) who study the effect of opinion leaders on market
outcomes. It is assumed that an actor can choose among two alternatives. For instance,
this can be a market in which the actors have to decide whether they should buy or
not buy a joint product, or a voting situation in which the members of the society have
to choose to vote either yes or no on a specific proposal. From now onwards we will
refer to a voting situation only. However, all results presented in this paper also apply
to markets. We assume that the actors in a society have to decide whether they would
like to remain with the status quo or whether a specific exogenous proposal leading to
a new state of the society should be adopted. We assume that the proposal has been
distributed among all actors. Each actor has to form its own opinion on the proposal, i.e.
without being influenced by any other actor. We will call this the actor’s inclination. The
society is partitioned into opinion leaders, followers, and independent actors. Followers
are free to choose their own opinion leaders. Then, in line with the inherent idea of opinion
leadership we suppose that via informal discussions of the proposal the inclinations of
the opinion leaders are becoming public information prior to the real decision. Only
after these discussions all actors will (secretly) choose their action which coincide with
the actors inclination if it is an opinion leader or independent actor. Concerning the
followers we assume that for their choice of action they - independently of their own
inclination - adopt the inclination of a certain fraction of its opinion leaders if these have
the same inclination. Finally, based on the individual choices of all actors a decision-
making mechanism determines the collective choice, i.e. whether the proposal is adopted
or not.
In the literature we can find several scores and measures being introduced for analyzing
collective decision-making situations with a possible influence between the actors.2 For
instance, some measures for arbitrary digraphs have been studied in van den Brink and
Borm (2002, [10]) and van den Brink and Gilles (2000, [11]). Since in the present paper
we consider an opinion leader-follower structure which can be represented by a bipartite
digraph, our model is related to the studies done in [10, 11]. Coming from a slightly
different direction are the works presented in the voting power literature. One of the
traditional measures is the Rae index (Rae, 1969, [35]) which measures the success of an
actor in a voting situation. An actor is said to be successful if its vote coincides with the
voting outcome. Such a successful actor can be additionally powerful. For the calculation
of the voting power of an actor a number of measures have been suggested. The most
prominent measures are the Banzhaf measure (Banzhaf, 1965, [1], see also Dubey and
Shapley, 1979, and Owen, 1975, [14, 34]), and the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and
Shubik, 1954, [36]). They ascribe power to an actor if its vote coincides with the voting
outcome, but this outcome would have been different if the actor changed its vote.3 As
we are also concerned with measuring satisfaction and power distributions, our research
is also related to the work on measurement of voting power. In the present paper we
analyze satisfaction in a digraph by the number of times the collective choice is the same
2 For the distinction between scores, measures, and indices, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998, [17]).
3 Both measures can also be derived from a probabilistic framework. See, e.g., Straffin (1977, 1978, [38, 39]) and,
more recently, Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, [30]).
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as the inclination of an actor. Power of an actor in a bipartite digraph is measured by
the number of times the actor has a swing, where by a swing we mean that an actor
by changing its inclination, given the inclinations of the others, enforces a change in the
collective choice. We show that the power and satisfaction scores that we introduce satisfy
some common dictator and opinion leader properties.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model, and in Section
3 we introduce novel satisfaction and power scores for actors in societies with opinion
leaders. In Section 4, we suggest some desirable properties of satisfaction and power for
such societies and prove that they are satisfied by our scores. In Section 5, we illustrate the
introduced scores and their properties for a society represented by five-actors digraphs.
In Section 6, we draw some conclusions, discuss some possible extensions of the model
and a future research agenda. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider the following model. There is a specific exogenous proposal on which n actors
have to decide upon either by choosing the yes- or no-action. Let 1 and 0 stand for the
choice of the yes and no-action, respectively, and let N = {1, ..., n} denote the set of
all actors forming the society which is partitioned into opinion leaders, followers, and
independent actors. We assume that the opinion leader-follower relations are given, i.e.
it is given which actors might influence the choice of action of certain other actors by
exercising some power over them.4 Furthermore, we suppose that each actor has already
formed an inclination to choose either the yes- or no-action. These are given by an
inclination vector I = (I1, ..., In) ∈ {1, 0}
n. This is a vector which kth component, Ik, is 1
if actor k has the inclination to choose the yes-action, and 0 if it is inclined to choose the
no-action. It is assumed that via informal discussions of the proposal the inclinations of
the opinion leaders have already become public information, i.e. each follower is aware of
the inclination of its opinion leader(s). While we allow that these discussions change the
inclinations of some actors, we suppose that when choosing their action and after that
inclinations do not alter. Moreover, we suppose that the choice of action is done secretly
which implies that we consider a simultaneous decision-making situation.
The structure of such ‘opinion leader-follower’ relations is represented by a bipartite
directed graph (or bipartite digraph) (N,D) with set of nodes N representing the actors
and D ⊂ N × N a binary relation on N . Since we take the set of actors N fixed, we
represent a digraph (N,D) just by its binary relation D. We denote the collection of all
bipartite digraphs on N , represented by their binary relation, by DN .
Let SD(k) and PD(k) denote the set of successors and predecessors of actor k in
digraph D, respectively, i.e., for each k ∈ N ,
SD(k) = {j ∈ N : (k, j) ∈ D}
PD(k) = {j ∈ N : (j, k) ∈ D}.
4 As a result of this influence, the ability of the followers to determine the outcome of the collective choice, i.e.
their power to do something (with respect to the outcome of the collective choice) might be affected.
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As we assume that each actor is either an opinion leader, follower or independent actor,
we consider digraphs D such that
|SD(k)| · |PD(k)| = 0 for each k ∈ N (1)
where |X| denotes the cardinality of set X. Let OL(D), FOL(D), and IND(D) denote the
sets of all opinion leaders, followers, and independent actors in digraph D, respectively,
i.e.
OL(D) = {k ∈ N : SD(k) 6= ∅}
FOL(D) = {k ∈ N : PD(k) 6= ∅}
IND(D) = N \ (OL(D) ∪ FOL(D)).
Therefore, by assumption (1) we have that
OL(D) ∩ FOL(D) = ∅,
and thus the sets OL(D), FOL(D) and IND(D) form a partition of the set N .
We refer to a pair (I,D) with I ∈ {0, 1}n and a bipartite digraph D ∈ DN as
described above as an opinion leader-follower collective choice situation. We assume that
the actors in OL(D) ∪ IND(D) make their simultaneous choice of action according to
their own inclinations. If a follower has just one opinion leader, it will choose according
to the inclination of its opinion leader. If a follower has more than one opinion leader,
then it will not follow its own inclination if and only if a certain fraction of its opinion
leaders have the same inclination and this differs from its own inclination.
Let V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n denote the choice vector, that is, a vector which kth
component, Vk, is 1 if actor k has chosen the yes-action, and 0 if k has chosen the no-
action. We assume that for every follower it is specified what fraction (more than one half)
of its predecessors it will follow. Assuming this fraction to be uniform over the actors,
there exists q ∈ [1
2
, 1) such that the choice vector V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n is recursively
given by:
Vk = Ik if k ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D),
and for k ∈ FOL(D) :
Vk =
{
x if |{j ∈ PD(k) : Ik = x}| > [q · |PD(k)|]
Ik otherwise,
(2)
where x ∈ {0, 1} and [Z] denotes the largest integer not greater than Z. According to (2),
given (I,D), if more than the fraction q of the opinion leaders of follower k has the same
inclination, then k will follow these opinion leaders, otherwise k will decide according to
its own inclination. In particular, if q = 1
2
, and half of the opinion leaders of k are inclined
to choose the yes-action and half to choose the no-action, the follower k will follow its
own inclination. For sufficiently large q, actor k follows its opinion leaders independently
of its own inclination only if they are all unanimous in their inclinations.
After all actors have chosen their actions, a collective choice is resulting according
to the decision-making mechanism in use. The decision-making mechanism is given by
the collective decision function C : {0, 1}n × DN → {0, 1} which assigns an outcome to
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every pair (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n × DN , that is, the value 0 if the collective decision is no,
and the value 1 if the collective decision is yes. Usually one only considers collective
decision functions C that are neutral5 and anonymous6. In this paper, we consider the
collective decision function by simple majority voting. Let for an action x ∈ {0, 1} and
V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n
nx(V (I,D)) = |{k ∈ N : Vk = x}|
be the number of actors choosing the action x. We restrict our analysis to situations in
which the number of actors is odd. The collective decision function is defined, for each
(I,D), as follows:
C(I,D) =
{
1 if n1(V (I,D)) > n0(V (I,D))
0 if n0(V (I,D)) > n1(V (I,D)).
(3)
3 Measuring satisfaction and power
In this section we define satisfaction and power scores for bipartite digraphs which rep-
resent a collective decision-making situation as described above. In general, a score or
measure for a bipartite digraph is a function f : DN → Rn which assigns an n-dimensional
real vector to every bipartite digraph on N .
Success of an actor in a voting game means that the actor’s vote coincides with the
voting outcome. Since in our model actors have their inclinations to choose either the
yes- or no-action before they actually choose, we propose to measure the satisfaction of
an actor which is related to how often an actor’s inclination prior to its actual choice
coincides with the collective choice.7 First, we define a score of satisfaction of an actor
under the given inclination vector, i.e., for each (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n ×DN and k ∈ N
SAT k(I,D) =
{
1 if C(I,D) = Ik
0 otherwise.
Next, based on satisfaction of an actor under each inclination vector, we define a score
of satisfaction of actor k in a bipartite digraph, SAT : DN → Rn, by
SATk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
SAT k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (4)
5 A collective decision function C is neutral if [C(I,D) = 1 if and only if C(Ic, D) = 0], where Ick = 1 if and only
if Ik = 0.
6 A collective decision functions C is anonymous if for every permutation pi : N → N , C(I,D) = C(pi(I), pi(D))
with pi(I)k = Ipi(k) and (pi(k), pi(j)) ∈ pi(D) if and only if (k, j) ∈ D.
7 Note, that this implies the general belief that (at least from the followers’ perspective) the existence of opinion
leaders is beneficial for a society. As already said above followers are prepared to accept the views of their
chosen opinion leaders even if this implies to choose an action against their own inclination. This is comparable
with the behavior of voters in democracy. They usually also do not question the existence of democracy if the
outcome of the collective choice is not in line with their view. Another example are fashion goods. Here followers
usually choose opinion leaders from which they assume that they correctly predict what will be popular in
the future. Followers often adopt their view even if they do not like the style they declare to be trendy in the
future. Hence, we can distinguish between two types of inclinations. The above type of inclinations given by I
being related to the outcome of the collective choice, and inclinations related to the procedure, i.e. that under
certain conditions followers have the inclination to align their individual choice with the view of their chosen
opinion leaders even if this is against their own inclinations. This also implies the existence of two notions of
satisfaction: one with respect to the outcome and one with respect to the procedure. In this paper we suggest
a score for the former one.
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Even more frequently than measuring success, the voting literature studies scores and
measures of power of an actor. Roughly speaking, we ascribe power to a successful actor
in a voting game if given the votes of the others, by changing its vote the actor changes
the voting outcome, i.e. the actor has a swing. Since we consider situations where the
actors have their inclinations before they choose their action, and the power of an actor
is related to its ability to alter the collective choice, we can relate the power of an actor
in this model to its inclination. Consequently, we ascribe power to an actor if the actor
by changing its inclination alters the collective choice.
Actor k ∈ N has a swing in (I,D) according to collective decision function C if
C(I,D) 6= C(I ′, D) with I ′k 6= Ik and I
′
j = Ij for all j ∈ N \ {k}. We measure power
under the given inclination vector by the number of swings:
POW k(I,D) =
{
1 if k has a swing in (I,D)
0 otherwise.
Then, the power score POW : DN → Rn is given by
POWk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
POW k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (5)
Note that both the satisfaction and power scores depend on the quota q, and hence
they should be formally denoted by SAT qk (D) and POW
q
k (D), respectively. Nevertheless,
for notational convenience we will always write SATk(D) and POWk(D) as denoted in (4)
and (5). In the next section we will study common dictator and opinion leader properties
of the satisfaction and power scores given by (4) and (5).
4 Properties for satisfaction and power scores based on
following a qualified majority of opinion leaders
Let us consider the scores SAT and POW defined in (4) and (5), respectively. Each
follower is assumed to follow a qualified majority of its opinion leaders, i.e. the choice
vector V is as defined in (2). We consider the neutral and anonymous collective decision
function C as defined in (3).
First, we state some properties for a score (or measure) f : DN → Rn. We start
with the property which says that the score for actors with a symmetric position in the
bipartite digraph is the same.
Property 1 (Symmetry) If SD(k) = SD(j) and PD(k) = PD(j) then fk(D) = fj(D).
Next, we consider two dictator properties. Clearly, a dictator, i.e. a unique opinion leader
who is followed by all other actors, has the power to change the outcome for any voting
profile by changing its own vote and, if the dictator votes according to its inclination then
the outcome will be the inclination of the dictator. Therefore the dictator property states
that, if there is a dictator, then the score of the dictator is equal to the total number of
possible inclination vectors. Note, that since we assume that no actor can be at the same
time a follower and an opinion leader, the dictator as defined above cannot be a follower.
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Property 2 (Dictator property) If D ∈ DN and h ∈ N is such that SD(h) = N \{h},
then fh(D) = 2
n.
Secondly, since a follower who has only one opinion leader has always to follow this
opinion leader, dictated independence states that the score of a follower with one opinion
leader does not change as long as this follower is dictated by a sole opinion leader.
Property 3 (Dictated independence) If D,D′ ∈ DN and k ∈ N are such that
|PD(k)| = |PD′(k)| = 1, then fk(D) = fk(D
′).
Next we present the three opinion leader properties saying something about the changes
in the score for different actors when the opinion leader-follower structure changes, in
particular when an actor gets a new opinion leader. The properties that we consider are
inspired by similar properties for solutions in cooperative game theory, where studying
these kinds of properties has a longer history. The most widely studied and applied
property in this field is fairness introduced by Myerson (1977, [33]) in the context of
cooperative games in which the players belong to some binary communication structure,
stating that deleting a communication link between two players changes their individual
payoffs by the same amount. In van den Brink (1997, [8]) this type of equal gain/loss
property is stated in terms of games in which the players belong to some hierarchical
structure, the so-called games with a permission structure, where it is stated that deleting
a domination arc between a successor and a predecessor changes the payoffs of these two
players by the same amount. In this paper we consider such kind of property for the
opinion leader-follower collective choice situation. Suppose that a follower gets one more
opinion leader. The equal absolute change property states that the changes in scores of
this follower and of its new opinion leader are either the same or are opposite, but the
same in absolute values.
Property 4 (Equal absolute change property) Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈
OL(D) ∪ IND(D), and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Then either fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fj(D
′)− fj(D)
or fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fj(D)− fj(D
′).
Although it is not obvious whether the scores of a follower and new opinion leader should
change in the same or in opposite direction, it seems reasonable that these changes are
in opposite direction in case the follower was an independent actor before the change.
Taking this into account, the opposite gain property states that, if an actor becomes a
sole opinion leader of another actor who was previously independent, then the sum of the
scores of these two actors does not change. This implies that in case the opinion leader
gains then this goes fully at the cost of the follower.
Property 5 (Opposite gain property) Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ IND(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪
IND(D), and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Then fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fj(D)− fj(D
′).
Finally, in the context of cooperative TU-games, Lehrer (1988, [32]) and Haller (1994,
[25]) introduced properties that consider collusion of players. In particular, Haller (1994,
[25]) considers different types of collusion neutrality properties requiring that the sum
of the payoffs of two colluding players does not change. In van den Brink (2010, [9]),
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these properties are applied to the above mentioned games with a hierarchical permission
structure. In that model, deleting a domination link between a successor and a predecessor
is interpreted as a collusion between this predecessor and another predecessor with respect
to the influence over the successor, leading to a power neutrality property stating that the
sum of payoffs of the two colluding predecessors should not change. A similar reasoning
in our underlying opinion leader-follower collective choice situation is reflected in power
neutrality for two opinion leaders which states that, if a follower with one opinion leader
gets a second opinion leader, then the sum of scores of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ opinion leaders
does not change. In other words, the change for the new (second) opinion leader is opposite
but in absolute value equal to the change for the old (first) opinion leader.
Property 6 (Power neutrality for two opinion leaders) Let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D)
and g ∈ OL(D) such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D), and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}.
Then fh(D
′) + fg(D
′) = fh(D) + fg(D).
Next, we state the first main result which shows that the satisfaction score satisfies all
the six properties mentioned above, if the choice vector is defined by (2).
Theorem 1 Let the choice vector V be defined by (2). The satisfaction score SAT :
DN → Rn defined in (4) satisfies symmetry, the dictator property, dictated independence,
the equal absolute change property, the opposite gain property, and power neutrality for
two opinion leaders.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix. We note that from the
proof that SAT satisfies the equal absolute change property we obtain as a corollary that
whenever the satisfaction of two actors changes in the same direction after one becomes
opinion leader of the other, then in the new situation the follower chooses its action
according to its own inclination.
Corollary 1 For every D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N such that PD(j) 6= ∅, h ∈ (OL(D) ∪
IND(D))\PD(j) and D
′ = D∪{(h, j)}, whenever SATh(I,D
′)−SATh(I,D) = SATj(I,D
′)−
SATj(I,D) = 1, we have Vj(I,D
′) = Ij.
It turns out that the power score POW also satisfies all six axioms, if the choice vector is
defined by (2).
Theorem 2 Let the choice vector V be defined by (2). The power score POW : DN → Rn
defined in (5) satisfies symmetry, the dictator property, dictated independence, the equal
absolute change property, the opposite gain property, and power neutrality for two opinion
leaders.
The proof of this theorem also can be found in the appendix.
5 Examples
In order to illustrate the developed scores and obtained results we analyze a society
consisting of five actors, i.e. N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We assume eight potential opinion leader-
follower structures for this society, each represented by a digraph. For the followers we
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assume three different levels of the qualified majorities of the opinion leaders required to
adapt their own behavior,
q =
1
2
, q′ =
2
3
, q′′ =
3
4
.
We analyze the following digraphs (see Figures 1a - 1h):
D0 = ∅ (Figure 1a, no opinion leaders)
D1 = {(2, 1)} (Figure 1b, actor 2 is the sole opinion leader of actor 1)
D2 = {(2, 1), (3, 1)} (Figure 1c, actors 2 and 3 are the opinion leaders of actor 1)
D3 = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)} (Figure 1d, actors 2, 3 and 4 are the opinion leaders of 1)
D4 = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 1)} (Figure 1e, actors in N \{1} are the opinion leaders of 1)
D5 = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)} (Figure 1f, actor 1 is a dictator)
D6 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} (Figure 1g, actor 2 follows 1, actor 4 follows 3)
D7 = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 4)} (Figure 1h, actor 2 follows 1, actors 3 and 5 are the opinion
leaders of 4).
For this setup we show how the number of opinion leaders affects the relations between
actors’ satisfaction and power scores.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Note that in digraphD3, in which actor 1 has three opinion leaders, when following the
qualified majority of its opinion leaders, under q = 1
2
, actor 1 will always decide according
to the inclination of at least two of its opinion leaders with the same inclination. Under
q′ = 2
3
and q′′ = 3
4
, it will follow its opinion leaders independently of its own inclination
only when they are unanimous. In digraph D4, in which actor 1 has four opinion leaders,
under q and q′ actor 1 will follow at least three unanimous opinion leaders, but it will
decide according to its own inclination if two of its opinion leaders have the positive
inclination, and two have the negative inclination. Under q′′ agent 1 follows its opinion
leaders 2, 3, 4, 5, independently of its own inclination only if they are unanimous in their
inclinations. When an actor has two opinion leaders, like in D2 and D7, following the
qualified majority of the opinion leaders means, of course, following the opinion leaders
independently of their own inclination only when they are unanimous.
Tables 1 and 2 present the chosen individual actions and the collective choices based
on the collective decision function as given in (3) for digraphs D0 to D3, and D4 to D7,
respectively. The sign “-” means that for a given I, the result (either the chosen action
or the collective choice) is the same as in D0.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 shows the satisfaction and power scores for the actors in the situations repre-
sented by digraphs D0 to D7.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Note that for digraph D3 with actor 1 as follower and actors 2, 3, and 4 as its opinion
leaders, the satisfaction and power score of the follower (the opinion leaders, respectively)
increases (decreases, respectively) when the quota increases from q to q′, and each of these
two scores remains the same when the quota increases from q′ to q′′. On the other hand,
the scores of each actor in digraph D4 are the same for q, q
′, and q′′.
Using the scores calculated in Table 3, we can illustrate the properties presented in
Section 4. Symmetry is obviously satisfied by both scores in all digraphs. The scores of
satisfaction and power of actors in digraph D5 with actor 1 as a dictator, satisfy the
dictator property. Dictated independence can be illustrated with the scores in question
of actor 1 in D1, actors 2 and 4 in D6, and actor 2 in D7, with satisfaction always equal
to 16, and power always equal to 0.
In order to illustrate the equal absolute change property, let us first consider digraphs
D2 and D3 with q =
1
2
, where the follower 1, having already two opinion leaders in D2
(actors 2 and 3), gets his new opinion leader in D3, actor 4. The following holds:
SAT4(D3)− SAT4(D2) = 24− 20 = 20− 16 = SAT1(D2)− SAT1(D3)
and
POW4(D3)− POW4(D2) = 16− 8 = 8− 0 = POW1(D2)− POW1(D3).
On the other hand, when considering D3 and D4 with q =
1
2
, where actor 5 becomes a
new opinion leader of actor 1, we have:
SAT5(D4)− SAT5(D3) = 22− 16 = SAT1(D4)− SAT1(D3)
and
POW5(D4)− POW5(D3) = 12− 0 = POW1(D4)− POW1(D3).
The opposite gain property can be seen when comparing D0 with D1, and D1 with D6.
Indeed, for the latter case, we have:
SAT4(D1) + SAT3(D1) = 20 + 20 = 16 + 24 = SAT4(D6) + SAT3(D6)
and
POW4(D1) + POW3(D1) = 8 + 8 = 0 + 16 = POW4(D6) + POW3(D6).
Power neutrality for two opinion leaders can be shown when comparing D1 with D2, and
D6 with D7. Indeed, for the follower 1 in D1 and D2, and actors 2 and 3 as actor 1’s
opinion leaders, we get as follows:
SAT2(D1) + SAT3(D1) = 28 + 20 = 24 + 24 = SAT2(D2) + SAT3(D2)
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and
POW2(D1) + POW3(D1) = 24 + 8 = 16 + 16 = POW2(D2) + POW3(D2).
We want to wind up this section with some observations concerning satisfaction, power
and resulting outcome effects of different opinion leader-follower structures. Comparing
D0 with D3 for q
′ and q′′ and D4 for q, q
′ and q′′ from Tables 1 and 2, we can find that for
all actors’ satisfaction and power is always identical, i.e. it has no effect whether an actor
is an opinion leader, follower, or independent actor or whether the society is structured in
one way or the other. Moreover, if actors become opinion leaders or followers their effect
on the outcome does not change. Hence, for these structures it does not matter whether
there exists no or three or four opinion leaders if there is only up to one follower. However,
to establish an opinion leader in a society without any opinion leader (moving from D0
to D1) has some effect on the outcome of the collective choice: it changes in 18.75 percent
of the cases, but adding another opinion leader to an existing opinion leader (moving
from D1 to D2) decreases the number of cases where the outcome changes. In contrast to
the case without an opinion leader, the outcome alters only in 6.25 percent of the cases.
Hence, the existence of only one opinion leader has a stronger effect to society as having
a second one if there exists only one follower.
6 Future research
The existence of opinion leaders and their influence over other actors can be seen in
every day life situations: in small as well as in large societies be it in politics or business.
Both satisfaction and power are the very natural measures of actors’ strength or status in
such situations. Although, as mentioned in the introduction, there exist several related
theoretical studies in the literature on voting models and on networks, the approach
which we use in the paper, i.e. the analysis of opinion leader-follower structures and the
properties of the scores in question has brought up several innovative elements and can
also be regarded to contribute to knowledge, in particular, in marketing.
However, there are several improvements one could bring to this framework in future
research. First of all, after stating some initial properties of satisfaction and power scores
for opinion leader-follower structures, a next step is to deliver full axiomatic characteri-
zations of the satisfaction and power scores, which would show a difference between the
scores from the axiomatic point of view. In van den Brink, Rusinowska and Steffen (2010,
[12]) properties presented in this paper are used to axiomatize these scores in the special
case of unanimity, i.e. independently from its own inclination a follower will choose the
action which corresponds to the inclination of its opinion leader(s), if all of them have
the same inclination, but will choose an action which corresponds to its own inclination,
if the inclinations of its opinion leader(s) are not all the same. In this axiomatic system
the satisfaction and power scores differ only with respect to some normalization axiom.
In this paper we assumed that an actor cannot be at the same time an opinion leader
for some actor(s) and a follower of some other actor(s). In a future research on this topic,
one could try to relax this assumption and to consider a more general digraph, allowing
the sets of predecessors and successors of a given actor to be both nonempty. In terms
of Troldahl’s (1966, [41]) two-cycle flow of communication model this would allow us to
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include the experts as an additional group of actors into our analysis acting as opinion
leaders of the opinion leaders.
Furthermore, we could apply the same approach to some related models on organi-
zational hierarchies based on subordinates and their superiors (see, e.g., Hammond and
Thomas, 1990, [26]), where an organizational choice is to be made. Although such topics
are naturally related to our present work, we expect that results on the properties of the
scores in question in the superior-subordinate structures will be quite different from the
ones obtained in the present model.
Since we consider the two-action model, a natural and useful generalization of the
framework will be to enlarge the set of possible actions, i.e., to follow some works on
abstention (see, e.g. Braham and Steffen, 2002, Felsenthal and Machover, 1997, 1998,
2001, Tchantcho et al., 2008, [7, 16–18, 40]), and on multi-choice games (see e.g. Grabisch
and Rusinowska, 2010, and Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993, [22, 28]). Related models are also
games with r alternatives, where the alternatives are not ordered; see Bolger (1986, 1993,
2000, 2002, [2–5]). Also in Freixas (2005a, 2005b, [19, 20]) and Freixas and Zwicker (2003,
[21]), the authors consider decision-making situations, i.e. voting systems, with several
levels of approval in the input and output, where those levels are qualitatively ordered.
They introduce (j, k) simple games, in which each actor expresses one of j possible levels
of input support, and the output consists of one of k possible levels of collective support.
Finally, another issue of future research agenda would be to apply the opinion leader-
follower collective choice situation to concrete situations of real life.
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Appendix
In this appendix we provide all proofs of the results in this paper.
Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward that SAT satisfies symmetry.
The dictator property follows straightforward since a dictator is followed in all 2n
inclination vectors in {0, 1}n, i.e., if SD(h) = N\{h}, then C(I,D) = Ih for all I ∈ {0, 1}
n.
To show dictated independence, note that actor k always chooses an action according
to j’s inclination if PD(k) = {j}. That means that the collective choice is independent
of actor k’s inclination, i.e. C(I,D) = C(I ′, D) if Ih = I
′
h for all h ∈ N \ {k}. Hence, in
half of the inclination vectors C(I,D) = Ik and in the other half C(I,D) 6= Ik. So, SAT
satisfies dictated independence.
To show the equal absolute change property, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈
OL(D)∪IND(D) and D′ = D∪{(h, j)}. For all inclination vectors I such that C(I,D) =
C(I,D′), obviously it holds SAT j(I,D
′)−SAT j(I,D) = 0 = SAT h(I,D
′)−SAT h(I,D).
Let I ∈ {0, 1}n be such that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′). Then, C(I,D) 6= Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ih,
and therefore SAT h(I,D
′)− SAT h(I,D) = 1.
Case I: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] = q · |PD(j)| and an I exists so that C(I,D) 6=
C(I,D′). In this case q · |PD(j)| opinion leaders of j have inclination x = Ih 6= Ij.
Then Vj(I,D) = Ij and C(I,D) = Ij. But Vj(I,D
′) = Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ih 6= Ij.
Then, SAT j(I,D)−SAT j(I,D
′) = 1 = SAT h(I,D
′)−SAT h(I,D), and with (4) we get
SATh(D
′)− SATh(D) = SATj(D)− SATj(D
′).
Case II: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] < q · |PD(j)| and an I exists so that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D
′).
In this case [q · |PD(j)|]+1 opinion leaders of j have inclination x 6= Ih = Ij, [q · |PD(j)|]+
1 = [q · (|PD(j)| + 1)], Vj(I,D) 6= Ij, C(I,D) 6= Ij. But Vj(I,D
′) = Ij = Ih and
C(I,D′) = Ij. Then, SAT j(I,D
′)− SAT j(I,D) = 1 = SAT h(I,D
′)− SAT h(I,D), and
with (4) we have SATh(D
′)− SATh(D) = SATj(D
′)− SATj(D).
Hence, SAT satisfies the equal absolute change property.
To show the opposite gain property, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ IND(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪
IND(D) and D′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Suppose that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′). Then it must hold that
actor j had to deviate from its inclination and follow h, and this must result in a change
of collective choice from Ij to Ih, with Ij 6= Ih. So, C(I,D) = Ij 6= Ih and C(I,D
′) =
Ih 6= Ij. Then, SAT j(I,D
′) = SAT j(I,D) − 1 and SAT h(I,D
′) = SAT h(I,D) + 1.
So, SAT h(I,D
′)−SAT h(I,D) = −(SAT j(I,D
′)−SAT j(I,D)) ≥ 0. Obviously, this last
equality also holds if C(I,D) = C(I,D′). Thus, with (4) we have SATh(D
′)−SATh(D) =
−(SATj(D
′)− SATj(D)) ≥ 0, showing that SAT satisfies the opposite gain property.
To show power neutrality for two opinion leaders, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D) and
g ∈ OL(D) such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}.
Obviously, if C(I,D) = C(I,D′), then SAT h(I,D
′) − SAT h(I,D) = SAT g(I,D) −
SAT g(I,D
′) = 0. Suppose now that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′). Then it must hold that actor
j initially had to choose an action against its inclination and now can choose an action
according to its inclination because its new opinion leader h has the same inclination.
So, for g ∈ PD(j) we have C(I,D) = Ig 6= Ij = Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ij = Ih 6= Ig.
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Then, SAT h(I,D
′) − SAT h(I,D) = SAT g(I,D) − SAT g(I,D
′) = 1. Thus, with (4) we
have SATh(D
′) − SATh(D) = SATg(D) − SATg(D
′), showing that SAT satisfies power
neutrality for two opinion leaders.

Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward that POW satisfies symmetry.
Since a dictator has a swing in every inclination vector, POW satisfies the dictator
property. Since an actor with a unique opinion leader never has a swing, POW satisfies
dictated independence.
To show the equal absolute change property, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D), h ∈
OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Note that POWh(I,D) = 1 implies that
POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
Case I: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] = q · |PD(j)|. We distinguish the following subcases:
(i) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders of j have the same
inclination, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(ii) If I is such that less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders of j have the inclination
x ∈ {0, 1} and less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the inclination y ∈ {0, 1} \ {x},
then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(iii) Suppose that I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the same
inclination, say x ∈ {0, 1}, and less than [q · |PD(j)|] have the different inclination y ∈
{0, 1} \ {x}.
(a) If Ij = x 6= y = Ih, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) =
POWh(I,D
′).
(b) Let x = Ih 6= y = Ij. If POWj(I,D) = 1, then POWj(I,D) − POWj(I,D
′) = 1
and POWh(I,D
′) − POWh(I,D) = 1. Moreover, for I
′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x = I ′j =
I ′h 6= y, I
′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h}, POWj(I
′, D) − POWj(I
′, D′) = 1 and POWh(I
′, D′) −
POWh(I
′, D) = 0, but for I ′′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x 6= I ′′j = I
′′
h = y, I
′′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h},
POWj(I
′′, D)− POWj(I
′′, D′) = 0 and POWh(I
′′, D′)− POWh(I
′′, D) = 1.
In a similar way we can consider the case when [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders of j have
one inclination, and [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders have the other inclination.
Thus, with (5), we get POWh(D
′)− POWh(D) = POWj(D)− POWj(D
′).
Case II: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] < q · |PD(j)|, and [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 = [q · (|PD(j)|+ 1)].
We distinguish the following cases.
(i) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 2 opinion leaders of j have the same
inclination, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(ii) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] (or less) opinion leaders of j have one
inclination and less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the other inclination, then
POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(iii) Suppose I is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders have the same inclination,
say x ∈ {0, 1}. Then POWj(I,D) = 0. There are several possibilities.
(a) If Ij = x = Ih 6= y, then POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(b) Suppose x = Ih 6= y = Ij. Then, POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and if, moreover, POWh(I,D) =
1, we have POWh(I,D
′) = 1. Further, for I ′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x 6= I ′j = I
′
h =
y, I ′k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h}, POWh(I
′, D) = POWh(I
′, D′) = 1 and POWj(I
′, D′) =
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POWj(I
′, D) = 0, and for I ′′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x = I ′′j 6= I
′′
h = y, I
′′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h},
POWj(I
′′, D) = POWj(I
′′, D′) = 0 and POWh(I
′′, D′) = POWh(I
′′, D). Suppose now
that POWh(I,D) = 0. If POWh(I,D
′) = 0 as well, then POWh(I,D
′)− POWh(I,D) =
POWj(I,D
′)−POWj(I,D), and the same holds for I
′ and I ′′. If POWh(I,D
′) = 1, then
POWh(I,D
′)−POWh(I,D) = 1 and POWj(I,D
′)−POWj(I,D) = 0, POWh(I
′, D′)−
POWh(I
′, D) = 1 and POWj(I
′, D′)− POWj(I
′, D) = 1, but
POWh(I
′′, D′)− POWh(I
′′, D) = 0 and POWj(I
′′, D′)− POWj(I
′′, D) = 1.
Thus, with (5), POWh(D
′)− POWh(D) = POWj(D
′)− POWj(D).
Hence, POW satisfies the equal absolute change property.
To show the opposite gain property, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ IND(D), h ∈ OL(D) ∪
IND(D) and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Since in D′ actor j has to choose an action according to
its unique opinion leader h, j has never a swing in D′, i.e. POWj(D
′) = 0. So, we have to
show that POWh(D
′)− POWh(D) = POWj(D) ≥ 0. We distinguish the following three
cases.
(i) If h does not have a swing in (I,D) but j has a swing in (I,D), then h has a swing
in (I,D′), i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 0 and POWj(I,D) = 1 then POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
(ii) If h has a swing in (I,D), then h has a swing in (I,D′), i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 1
then POWh(I,D
′) = 1. If, moreover, also j has a swing in (I,D) then h has also a swing
in (I ′, D′) with I ′j = I
′
h 6= Ih = Ij, i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 1 and POWj(I,D) = 1 then
POWh(I
′, D′) = 1.
(iii) Finally, if h does not have a swing in (I,D) and j does not have a swing in
(I,D), then the only possibility for h to have a swing in (I,D′) is as described in the
last case before. So, POWh(D
′) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n POW h(I,D
′) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n(POW h(I,D) +
POW j(I,D)) ≥ 0, showing that POW satisfies the opposite gain property.
To show power neutrality for two opinion leaders, let D,D′ ∈ DN , j ∈ FOL(D) and
g ∈ OL(D) such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Note
that POWg(I,D) = 0 implies that POWg(I,D
′) = 0. Moreover, POWh(I,D) = 1 implies
POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
Note that it is impossible that at the same time POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) ≥ 1
and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 0. Moreover, it is impossible that at the same time
POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) ≤ 1 and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 2.
Furthermore, note that for I ∈ {0, 1}n
[POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) = 2 and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 1] if and only if
[Ih = Ig 6= Ij and for I
′ ∈ {0, 1}n given by I ′h = I
′
g 6= Ig(= Ih), and I
′
k = Ik for all
k ∈ N \ {g, h} (and thus I ′j = I
′
h = I
′
g), satisfies POWh(I
′, D′) + POWg(I
′, D′) = 0 and
POWh(I
′, D) + POWg(I
′, D) = 1].
Hence, POW satisfies power neutrality for two opinion leaders. 
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Figure 1: Digraphs D0 - D7
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I = V (I,D0) C(I, V ) V (I,D1) C(I, V ) V (I,D2) C(I, V ) V (I,D3) C(I, V ) V (I,D3) C(I, V )
with q with q with q′, q′′ with q′, q′′
(0,0,0,0,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,0) 0 (1,1,0,0,0) - - - - - - -
(0,0,1,0,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,1,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,0,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,0) 0 - - - - (0,1,0,0,0) - - -
(1,0,1,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,0,0) - - - (0,0,1,0,0) - - -
(1,0,0,1,0) 0 (0,0,0,1,0) - (0,0,0,1,0) - (0,0,0,1,0) - - -
(1,0,0,0,1) 0 (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) -
(0,1,1,0,0) 0 (1,1,1,0,0) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) 1 (1,1,1,0,0) 1 - -
(0,1,0,1,0) 0 (1,1,0,1,0) 1 - - (1,1,0,1,0) 1 - -
(0,1,0,0,1) 0 (1,1,0,0,1) 1 - - - - - -
(0,0,1,1,0) 0 - - - - (1,0,1,1,0) 1 - -
(0,0,1,0,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,1,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,1,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,1) 1 - - - - (0,1,0,0,1) 0 - -
(1,0,1,1,0) 1 (0,0,1,1,0) 0 - - - - - -
(1,0,1,0,1) 1 (0,0,1,0,1) 0 - - (0,0,1,0,1) 0 - -
(1,0,0,1,1) 1 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 - -
(0,1,1,1,0) 1 (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) -
(0,1,1,0,1) 1 (1,1,1,0,1) - (1,1,1,0,1) - (1,1,1,0,1) - - -
(0,1,0,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,1,1) - - - (1,1,0,1,1) - - -
(0,0,1,1,1) 1 - - - - (1,0,1,1,1) - - -
(1,1,1,1,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,1,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,0,1,1,1) 1 (0,0,1,1,1) - - - - - - -
(0,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,1,1,1,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
Table 1. Individual and collective choices for digraphs D0 - D3
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I V (I,D4) C(I, V ) V (I,D4) C(I, V ) V (I,D5) C(I, V ) V (I,D6) C(I, V ) V (I,D7) C(I, V )
with q, q′ with q, q′ with q′′ with q′′
(0,0,0,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(1,0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) - (1,1,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,0,1,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,0) - (0,0,1,0,0) -
(0,0,0,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,0,0,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 - - - -
(1,0,1,0,0) (0,0,1,0,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,1,1,0) 1 (1,1,1,0,0) 1
(1,0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,1,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) - (1,1,0,0,0) -
(1,0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,1) 1
(0,1,1,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,0) - (0,0,1,0,0) -
(0,1,0,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) -
(0,0,1,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(0,0,1,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,1) 1 (0,0,1,1,1) 1
(0,0,0,1,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,1) - - -
(1,1,1,0,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,0) - - -
(1,1,0,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,0) 0 (1,1,0,0,0) 0
(1,1,0,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
(1,0,1,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) -
(1,0,1,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,0,0,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,1) - (1,1,0,1,1) -
(0,1,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,0) 0
(0,1,1,0,1) (1,1,1,0,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,1) - (0,0,1,1,1) -
(0,1,0,1,1) (1,1,0,1,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0,0,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0
(0,0,1,1,1) (1,0,1,1,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 - - - -
(1,1,1,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,1,0,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,1) - - -
(1,0,1,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(0,1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,1) - (0,0,1,1,1) -
(1,1,1,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
Table 2. Individual and collective choices for digraphs D4 - D7
f(D) = SAT (D) POW (D)
D =
D∅ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D1 (16,28,20,20,20) (0,24,8,8,8)
D2 (20,24,24,20,20) (8,16,16,8,8)
D3 with q (16,24,24,24,16) (0,16,16,16,0)
D3 with q
′, q′′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D4 with q, q
′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D4 with q
′′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D5 (32,16,16,16,16) (32,0,0,0,0)
D6 (24,16,24,16,24) (16,0,16,0,16)
D7 (24,16,24,16,24) (16,0,16,0,16)
Table 3. Satisfaction and power in digraphs D0 - D7
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